INTRODUCTION
Logic programming has been regarded as an appropriate tool for knowledge representation in articial intelligence. From this viewpoint, theories of logic programming with negation as failure (or default negation), classical negation (or explicit negation) and disjunctive information have been developed (a comprehensive survey is found in [4] ). This paper is concerned with such a theory of an extended class of logic programs as a knowledge representation language. Our extension of logic programs is called general extended disjunctive programs (GEDPs). Such programs allow negation as failure not only in the body of a rule as negative premises but in the head as negative conclusions. That is, a rule in a GEDP is in the form L 1 j . . . j L k j not L k+1 j . . . j not L l L l+1 ; . . . ; L m ; not L m+1 ; . . . ; not L n where each L i is a positive or negative literal, not is the negation-as-failure operator, and \j" represents a disjunction. The class of GEDPs has the following nice properties:
The syntax of programs is general enough to strictly include the class of extended disjunctive programs (EDPs). The class of GEDPs is a quite natural extension of EDPs in the sense that negation as failure appears symmetrically in a rule. The semantics of programs is also a natural generalization of the answer set semantics for EDPs by Gelfond and Lifschitz [22] , thus coincides with the stable model semantics [21] for normal logic programs. The class of GEDPs is more expressive than the class of EDPs in the sense that a program can have a non-minimal answer set. Furthermore, we will show that the introduction of negation as failure in the head to logic programming is useful and important in the following sense:
A lot of new applications to knowledge representation can be properly described using GEDPs. The class of GEDPs oers a theoretical tool for investigating a theory of existing framework of logic programming. Specically, it enables us to better understand the supported model semantics [3, 45] and to have a proof procedure for it. There is a procedural semantics for GEDPs that is an extension of existing proof procedures for EDPs. There are close relationships between the class of GEDPs and existing nonmonotonic formalisms, which are also natural extensions of previously known results [19, 39, 12 ].
Historical Background
Historically, the class of GEDPs 1 was introduced by Lifschitz and Woo [41] as a subset of the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure (MBNF). MBNF was proposed by Lifschitz [38] as a general nonmonotonic logic that includes the class of logic programs permitting both classical negation and negation as failure. In fact, MBNF is one of the most expressive logics and can serve as a common framework that unies several nonmonotonic formalisms. As Lifschitz noted, however, MBNF is purely semantical and too intractable to be used directly for representing knowledge. Then, Lifschitz and Woo investigated a large subset of propositional MBNF called PL-theories|theories with \protected literals". In brief, protected literals are formulas of the forms BL and not L, where L is a literal and B and not are two nonmonotonic modal operators respectively meaning minimal belief and negation as failure. Then, a PL-theory is dened as a set of PL-formulas which are formed by protected literals using :, B, not and^.
The semantics of PL-theories is similar to the answer set semantics for EDPs, and can be described in terms of sets of objective literals. Moreover, each PL-theory is shown to be replaced with an equivalent set of formulas of the form BL . . . ; not L n in the logic programming context. Hence, the class of GEDPs is such a \logic programming" fragment of MBNF.
Lifschitz and Woo consider the possibility of positive occurrences of negation as failure (positive not, in short) in GEDPs. 2 Syntactically, this extension is quite natural and attractive, and each rule with negation as failure in the head can be regarded as a bisequent [8] , that is, a pair of positive and negative beliefs appears in both the antecedent and the succedent of a sequent.
The semantics of GEDPs is also clearly dened in terms of the notion of answer sets [41] . A unique feature of GEDPs, which distinguishes them from other traditional logic programs, is that the minimality of answer sets for EDPs [22] does not hold in general. For example, the program consisting of the rule p j not p has two answer sets: one containing p, and the other containing neither p nor :p. In this paper, we will analyze this peculiar property of GEDPs in detail from the two important viewpoints:
(i) Applications of non-minimal answer sets in knowledge representation; (ii) Semantical and computational properties of non-minimal answer sets.
Non-Minimality in Knowledge Representation
Most of the semantics of logic programs proposed so far satisfy the principle of minimality in some sense. For example, the least model semantics for denite Horn programs, the minimal model semantics for positive disjunctive programs, the perfect model semantics for stratied (disjunctive) programs, and the stable model semantics for normal (disjunctive) programs satisfy the principle in the sense that every canonical model of a logic program is its minimal model. The answer set semantics for EDPs also satises the principle since no answer set of a program is smaller than any other answer set. Hence, it has been argued that the principle of minimality is one of the most important criteria that each semantics should obey if it is used as a \commonsense" semantics [59] .
The situation is similar in research on nonmonotonic formalisms. Circumscription [47] is directly based on minimal models, and (disjunctive) default logic [52, 23] has the property that an extension of a (disjunctive) default theory is not a subset of any other extension. While an exception can be seen in autoepistemic logic [49] , the denition of stable expansions has been modied so that each obtainable expansion \rationally" satises the principle of minimality. For example, fBp pg has two stable expansions, one containing p and the other not in their objective parts, but only the latter is the moderately (or strongly) grounded expansion [33] .
On the other hand, recent advances on theories of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning have revealed the declarative meaning of negation as failure as a nonmonotonic modal operator. MBNF is a nonmonotonic bimodal logic that directly allows the negation-as-failure operator not along with the B operator for minimal belief in a theory. Once not is allowed positively in a PL-theory or a GEDP, the principle of minimality does not hold any more. This observation gives a justication of the introduction of not in the head in logic programs. Namely, the class of GEDPs strictly includes the class of EDPs both in the syntactical and semantical senses.
Then, a question arises about the use of negation as failure positively in MBNF or logic programming. Namely, one may feel a resistance to the existence of nonminimal answer sets. From the traditional viewpoint, a non-minimal answer set contains a redundant information and is of no use for representing commonsense knowledge. In fact, Lifschitz and Woo raised a question about the utility of a disjunction of literals and their negation like p j not p , and discussed [41, page 608] :
It remains to be seen whether rules like this may have applications to knowledge representation. In this respect, we will show that the non-minimality of answer sets is an important property for applying logic programming or MBNF to represent various domains in which the principle of minimality is too strong. For example, we show all the following applications can be characterized in terms of GEDPs.
Abductive logic programming Consider the logic program f p a g with the abducible atom a. For this program, ; is the least model. However, given the observation p, the nonminimal model fa; pg is considered as the intended belief model. Inclusive interpretation of disjunctions When we interpret the disjunction p j q exclusively, both fpg and fqg are two alternative minimal models. But if it is interpreted inclusively, the non-minimal model fp; qg becomes another intended model. Circumscription with xed predicates The circumscription of p in f q p g with q xed has two models, ; and fp; qg. Here, the second model is not minimal. On the rst point, we will show that the rule a j not a can be used to represent the statement that a is a hypothesis in a program. The fact that abduction can be represented by a single logic program is a particularly striking result. Since an abductive program is usually represented by a pair of background knowledge and candidate hypotheses, it is important to know how such meta-level information of hypotheses can be expressed at the object level. Such an expression bridges the gap between abductive and usual (non-abductive) logic programming, and contributes to the computational aspect of abduction. Namely, we can apply any proof procedure for usual logic programs to abductive programs.
On the second point, an inclusive interpretation of the disjunction p j q is specied by rules p j not p and q j not q together with the integrity constraint not p; not q. In this case, the answer sets of the program are fpg, fqg, and fp; qg, where the third one represents the inclusive model. Classical logic programming semantics based on minimal models are always minimal hence cannot represent such inclusive disjunctions in general. By contrast, the possible model semantics [11, 53, 55] has a non-minimal feature, and can represent both inclusive and exclusive disjunctions. We will show that the possible model semantics for positive/normal disjunctive programs are characterized by the answer set semantics for GEDPs.
On the third point, the fact that q is xed in circumscription is also represented by the rule q j not q . In this sense, we can see that xed predicates play the same role as abducible predicates in abductive logic programming. In classical logic programming, every predicate is usually minimized under the closed world reasoning. Fixed predicates are also considered in ECWA [24] , which is equivalent to circumscription under some conditions. We will show that ECWA without varying predicates can be simply computed through GEDPs.
From the viewpoint of nonmonotonic reasoning, among many nonmonotonic formalisms, Moore's autoepistemic logic can express a stable expansion whose objective part is larger than that of another expansion. We show that this non-minimal feature of autoepistemic logic is applicable to describe the semantics of GEDPs. We justify this result by providing a simple translation of GEDPs into autoepistemic logic, which is due to the results by Lifschitz and Schwarz [39] and Chen [12] .
Semantic Nature and Computation of GEDPs
One may consider that the use of positive not in MBNF or not in the head in GEDPs increases the computational complexity and that it is dicult to supply a procedural semantics in the presence of non-minimal answer sets. Two proof theories for MBNF proposed so far are not sucient in this respect. Chen [12] proposes a proof theory for PL-theories, which relies on the proof theory for the logic of only knowing [36] , so that a procedure would have to deal with modal logic K45. Beringer and Schaub [7] provide a proof procedure for a subset of MBNF, but this subset neither includes EDPs nor allows positive not.
In this regard, we will analyze the properties of GEDPs and the nature of not in the head from the viewpoint of program transformation.
First, we show a program transformation (called shifting) from a GEDP to an EDP such that the two programs have exactly the same answer sets. Such a transformation is possible if a GEDP satises the acyclic condition.
Secondly, we introduce an alternative semantics of GEDPs, called the supported set semantics, which is a natural generalization of the notion of supported models. Note that supported sets are not always minimal even for normal logic programs. For example, the logic program f p p g has two supported models, ; and fpg. Unlike the answer set semantics, the supported set semantics is shown to be always preserved by the shifting transformation from GEDPs to EDPs. Moreover, the supported set semantics can be characterized by the answer set semantics. Hence, this gives another application of non-minimal answer sets of GEDPs. These analyses help us to better understand the source of non-minimality of answer sets in GEDPs or supported sets in EDPs. As a by-product, we will have a procedure to compute the supported sets or supported models dened by [3, 45, 4, 9] .
Thirdly, we develop a polynomial-time translation of any GEDP into an EDP by replacing not in the head with new literals and constraints. With this translation, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the answer sets of the original GEDP and those of the translated EDP. This translation also contributes to the computational theory for GEDPs. Namely, the computational complexity of GEDPs is shown to remain in the same complexity class as EDPs, and computation of answer sets of GEDPs is realized using bottom-up model generation techniques for EDPs.
Outline of the Paper
This paper is a much extended version of the paper [29] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the answer set semantics for GEDPs and their basic properties. Section 3 shows practical applications of non-minimal answer sets such as abduction, inclusive disjunctions and circumscription with xed predicates, and characterizes these applications as GEDPs. Section 4 introduces the shifting transformation, which preserves the answer set semantics for acyclic GEDPs. Section 5 denes the supported set semantics for GEDPs, and compares it with the answer set semantics. Section 6 provides complexity results and computation of the answer set semantics for GEDPs. Section 7 shows connections to autoepistemic logic and other nonmonotonic logics. Section 8 discusses some related issues, and Section 9 gives a summary.
GENERAL EXTENDED DISJUNCTIVE PROGRAMS
This section overviews the answer set semantics of logic programs with negation as failure in the head. We regard a rule with variables as the set of its ground instances. Hence, in the semantics of logic programming in this paper, we can restrict our attention to (possibly innite) ground programs.
A general extended disjunctive program (GEDP) is a set of rules of the form
where L i 's are literals and n m l k 0. The disjunction to the left of is the head and the conjunction to the right of is the body of the rule. In GEDPs, negation as failure occurs positively, that is, not L j (k + 1 j l) may appear in the head of a rule. In this sense, negation as failure in the head is also called positive not. Intuitively, the rule (1) can be read as follows: If all L l+1 ; . . . ; L m are believed and all L m+1 ; . . . ; L n are disbelieved then either some L i (1 i k) should be believed or some L j (k + 1 j l) should be disbelieved.
A GEDP is called an extended disjunctive program (EDP) when it does not contain positive not, i.e., each rule is in the form (1) with k = l. An EDP is called (i) an extended logic program (ELP) if for each rule l 1; and (ii) a normal disjunctive program (NDP) if every L i is an atom. An NDP is called (i) a normal logic program (NLP) if for each rule l 1; and (ii) a positive disjunctive program (PDP) if it contains no not, i.e., for each rule m = n.
In the following, the set of all ground literals in the language is denoted as Lit. We say that a set of ground literals S Lit satises a ground rule of the form (1) i fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g S and fL m+1 ; . . . ; L n g \ S = ; imply either fL 1 ; . . . ; L k g \ S 6 = ; or fL k+1 ; . . . ; L l g 6 S.
As the semantics for GEDPs, we mainly consider the answer set semantics in this paper, while we later introduce the supported set semantics as an alternative semantics in Section 5.
The answer sets of a GEDP are dened by the following two steps. First, let P be a not-free EDP (i.e., for each rule k = l and m = n), and S Lit. Then, S is an answer set of P i S is a minimal set satisfying the conditions:
(i) S satises every ground rule from P , that is, for each ground rule 
. . . ; not L n from P such that fL k+1 ; . . . ; L l g S and fL m+1 ; . . . ; L n g \ S = ; : For programs of the form 5 S , their answer sets have already been dened. Then, S is an answer set of 5 i S is an answer set of 5 S .
Note that the above denition of answer sets of a GEDP is given in a way slightly dierent from that by Lifschitz and Woo [41] who additionally include in the language two special atoms T and F. When the language does not contain these special atoms, our denition of the reduct is equivalent to that given in [41, page 606], and thus both denitions of answer sets coincide. Obviously, when a program 5 is an EDP, the above denition of answer sets reduces to that given by Gelfond and Lifschitz [22] . When a program contains no classical negation, answer sets are also called stable models. This notion of stable models for programs possibly containing positive not also reduces to that for NDPs [51] and NLPs [21] .
The next proposition is a generalization of [4, Proposition 4.1 (a)].
Proposition 2.1. Every answer set of a GEDP 5 satises every ground rule from 5.
Proof. Let S be any answer set of 5. Since S is an answer set of 5 S , S satises every ground rule from 5 S . Namely, for any ground rule R of the form (2) We say that a GEDP 5 entails a literal L if L is included in all answer sets of 5. An answer set is consistent if it is not Lit. A GEDP 5 is consistent if it has a consistent answer set. An answer set S of a GEDP 5 is minimal if no other answer set S 0 of 5 satises S 0 S; otherwise, it is non-minimal. It is well known that every answer set of any EDP is minimal ( [22] and [41, Theorem 4] ). However, the minimality of answer sets no longer holds for GEDPs. This is an important property of GEDPs which was rstly observed by Lifschitz and Woo. For example, the program consisting of the rules: q p ; p j not p ; has two answer sets: ; and fp; qg.
APPLICATIONS OF NEGATION AS FAILURE IN THE HEAD
In this section, we show various applications of negation as failure in the head in GEDPs. The most important application is inference to explanation called abduction, which is one of the three fundamental modes of reasoning characterized by C. S. Peirce. We will also show that positive not is a useful tool to represent other non-minimal semantics for disjunctive logic programs, including the possible model semantics and circumscription with xed predicates. Some other applications will also be presented.
Abductive Programs
Abduction is an important form of reasoning not only for various AI problems but also for logic programming. Abductive logic programming is an extension of logic programming to perform abductive reasoning [32] . Here, we show that this extension can be characterized exactly using positive not in GEDPs, so that both abductive and non-abductive logic programming have the same expressive power.
The semantics of abduction we consider here is based on the belief set semantics by Inoue and Sakama [30] , but is extended to handle GEDPs. The belief set semantics is a generalization of the generalized stable model semantics dened by Kakas and Mancarella [31] for NLPs.
An abductive (general extended disjunctive) program is a pair h P; 0 i, where P is a (general extended disjunctive) program and 0 ( Lit) is a set of ground literals from P called abducibles. When P is an NLP and 0 is a set of atoms, we will often call an abductive program an abductive NLP. We often identify a set E ( 0) of abducibles with the program f j 2 E g. A set of literals S ( Lit) is a belief set of h P; 0 i i S is a consistent answer set of P [ E where E = S \ 0. 3 A belief set S is 0-minimal i no belief set T satises that T \ 0 S \ 0.
When S is a belief set and E = S \ 0, we often write S as S E . Note that each belief set reduces to a consistent answer set of P when 0 = ;. Belief sets are called belief models when P does not contain classical negation. Belief models are also called generalized stable models [31] when P is an NLP. Let h P; 0 i be an abductive program, and O a ground literal which represents an observation. A set E ( 0) is a credulous explanation of O (with respect to h P; 0 i) i there is a belief set S E which satises O. On the other hand, E ( 0) is a skeptical explanation of O i every belief set S such that E = S \ 0 satises O. When we just say an explanation, it is a credulous explanation. An explanation E of O is minimal if no E 0 E is an explanation of O.
As discussed in [30] , without loss of generality, we can assume that an observation O is a non-abducible ground literal. Furthermore, the problem to nd explanations is essentially equivalent to nd belief sets since E is a minimal explanation of O with respect to h P; 0 i i S E is a 0-minimal belief set of h P [ f not Og; 0 i. The most direct way to embed abducibles in a single program is as follows. Let h P; 0 i be an abductive program. For each abducible in 0, we supply the rule j not : (3) According to the non-minimality of answer sets of GEDPs, this rule has the eect to augment each answer set of P with either or nothing. Given an abductive program h P; 0 i, let abd(0) be the set of rules (3) obtained from 0. Theorem 3.2. A set S is a belief set of h P; 0 i i S is a consistent answer set of P [ abd(0).
Proof. Let E = S \ 0. It holds that abd(0) S = abd(0) E = E = E S .
Hence, S is a belief set of h P; 0 i i S is a consistent answer set of P [ E i S is a consistent answer set of P S [ E S i S is a consistent answer set of P S [ abd(0) S i S is a consistent answer set of P [ abd(0).
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Given a GEDP 5 and a set 0 of ground literals, we say an answer set S of 5 is 0-minimal if no other answer set S 0 of 5 satises that S 0 \ 0 S \ 0. a j not a ; b j not b : When the observation is p, both E = fag and E 0 = fa; bg are credulous explanations of p, and correspondingly, both S = fa; pg and S 0 = fa; p; b; :qg are answer sets of P 3 [ abd(0 3 ) containing p. Then, E is the minimal explanation of p. However, P 3 [ E has another answer set fa; qg which does not contain p, while S 0 is the unique answer set of P 3 [ E 0 . Hence, E 0 is preferable as the skeptical explanation of p, although its corresponding answer set S 0 of the GEDP is not 0 3 -minimal.
Assumptions with Preconditions
In the previous subsection, a set 0 of abducibles in an abductive program h P; 0 i was dened as a set of literals. Often however, we would like to introduce in 0 an abducible rule like L 1 ; . . . ; L m ; not L m+1 ; . . . ; not L n ; (4) where and L i 's are literals. This abducible rule intuitively means that if the rule is abduced then it is used for inference together with the background rules from P . This kind of extended abductive framework was introduced by Inoue [26] as a knowledge system in which both P and 0 are dened as ELPs, and has been shown to be a useful tool for representing commonsense knowledge.
An abducible rule (4) has the eect to introduce the literal as an assumption in a particular context in which the body of the rule is true. In this sense, in (4) can be considered as an assumption with preconditions. On the other hand, each abducible literal in an abductive program h P; 0 i dened in Section 3.1 is viewed as an abducible rule without precondition , and hence can be abduced globally.
An extended abductive framework can be formally dened as a pair h P; 0 i, where P is a GEDP and 0 is now an ELP consisting of rules of the form (4). The semantics of this abductive framework is slightly extended from that given in Section 3.1 as follows. For any ELP E, let head(E) be the heads of rules in E. A set of literals S ( Lit) is a belief set of h P; 0 i i S is a consistent answer set of P [ E where E 0 such that head(E) = S \ head(0 ). Clearly, this notion of belief sets reduces to the denition of belief sets in Section 3.1 when 0 is a set of abducible literals without preconditions. Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2. 2
In the next subsection, we show that abducible rules are also useful to represent inclusive disjunctions in disjunctive programs.
Inclusive Interpretation of Disjunctions
Another important application of positive not is to express an alternative semantics for disjunctive logic programs other than Gelfond and Lifschitz's answer set semantics. Here, we show that the possible model semantics for NDPs by Sakama and Inoue [55] can be characterized by the answer set semantics for GEDPs.
The possible model semantics was initially introduced for PDPs to enable one to specify both inclusive and exclusive interpretations of disjunctions [53, 11] . 4 Sakama and Inoue [56] have presented the equivalence between the possible model semantics for NDPs and the belief model semantics for abductive NLPs. Utilizing this result and Theorem 3.7, the embedding of the possible model semantics in GEDPs can be obtained. We show below a direct method to do it based on the embedding of abducible rules in GEDPs in Section 3.2.
For an NDP P , let disj(P ) be the disjunctive rules of P , i.e., those rules having more than one atom in their heads. A split program of P is a ground NLP obtained from P by replacing each ground disjunctive rule from disj(P ) of the form A 1 j . . . j A k A k+1 ; . . . ; A m ; not A m+1 ; . . . ; not A n (k > 1) (6) with rules A i A k+1 ; . . . ; A m ; not A m+1 ; . . . ; not A n for every A i 2 S ; where S is some non-empty subset of fA 1 ; . . . ; A k g. Then, a possible model of P is dened as an answer set (or stable model) of a split program of P [55] . Note that every stable model of P is a possible model of P , but not vice versa. For example, when P 5 = f p j q ; q p; r not p g ; fq; rg is both a stable model and a possible model of P 5 , but another possible model fp; qg is not a stable model of P 5 . Clearly, for NLPs, possible models coincide with stable models.
To obtain every possible model, let us consider the transformation pm which maps an NDP to a GEDP. Given an NDP P , pm(P ) is obtained by replacing every rule from P of the form (6) (4) in GEDPs was based on rules (5). The embedding of possible models is achieved in a similar manner by rules (7) except that the empty selection from the disjuncts of each disjunction is rejected by (8) in the transformation pm.
Lemma 3.8. [56] Let P be an NDP, and disj(P ) the disjunctive rules of P . Suppose that 0 is the NLP obtained from disj(P ) by replacing each disjunctive rule (6) with k rules A i A k+1 ; . . . ; A m ; not A m+1 ; . . . ; not A n for i = 1; . . . ; k ; and that IC is the set of rules of the form (8) obtained from the rules of the form (6) in disj(P ). Then, a set S of atoms is a possible model of P i S is a belief model of the abductive program h (P n disj(P )) [ IC; 0 i. Theorem 3.9. Let P be an NDP. A set S of atoms is a possible model of P i S is an answer set of pm(P ).
Proof. A direct consequence of Theorem 3.7 and Lemma 3.8. 2
Example 3.10. [11] Suppose that the NDP P 6 consists of three rules violent j psychopath suspect ; dangerous violent; psychopath ; suspect :
Here, the rst rule is replaced in pm(P 6 ) with three rules violent j not violent suspect ; psychopath j not psychopath suspect ; suspect ; not violent; not psychopath : Then, pm(P 6 ) has three answer sets, fsuspect; violentg, fsuspect; psychopathg and fsuspect; violent; psychopath; dangerousg, which coincide with the possible models of P 6 . Note that the rst and second possible models of P 6 are also the answer sets of P 6 , while the third possible model is not. If we introduce the rule of closed world assumption [22] :A not A for any atom A into P 6 , then :dangerous is entailed in the answer set semantics, which is too strong. By contrast, :dangerous is not entailed in both the possible model semantics for P 6 and the answer set semantics for pm(P 6 ).
Fixed Predicates
One of the interesting dierences between circumscription [47, 37] and disjunctive logic programming is the existence of xed predicates. As a typical example, we expect that something does not y by default, but if it is a bird then it ies. We can write this as an axiom like bird flies with flies minimized using circumscription. Without knowing initially whether it is a bird or not, we can even deduce :f lies if bird is also minimized (as in standard logic programming) or is allowed to vary (as in circumscription). In this case, :bird is then concluded. However, this side eect about the bird may not be desired in many cases. This problem can be avoided if bird is xed (i.e., not allowed to vary) in circumscribing flies. The circumscription actually deduces :bird :f lies; so we conclude that it does not y unless it is a bird.
In classical logic programming, every predicate is usually minimized in a PDP by GCWA [48] , in which the answer sets of the program are exactly the minimal Herbrand models. An exception can be seen in ECWA proposed by Gelfond et al. [24] , which is equivalent to circumscription in the existence of the unique-name and domain-closure assumptions. We now formalize ECWA for PDPs without varying predicates.
Let T be a PDP consisting of rules of the form A 1 j . . . j A k B 1 ; . . . ; B m (k; m 0) where A i 's and B j 's are atoms. This rule can be identied with a rst-order formula B 1^. . .^B m A 1 _ . . . _ A k : Let P be the set of minimized predicates. The set of all predicates other than those in P are written Q and assumed to be xed. The following notation is due to Lifschitz [37] . The information of xed predicates can be encoded in GEDPs in the same way as the encoding of abducibles in abductive programs. Now let cir(T; P ) = T [ f q(x) j not q(x) j q 2 Q g; where x = x 1 ; . . . ; x n is a tuple of variables for n-ary predicate q in Q.
Theorem 3.11. Let T be a PDP, and P the minimized predicates. Then, M is a P -minimal Herbrand model of T i M is an answer set of cir(T; P ).
Proof. Let M be a P -minimal Herbrand model of T such that M \ Q = 9. Here, we also use Q to denote the set of ground atoms with predicates from Q. Then, M is a minimal Herbrand model (i.e., (P [ Q)-minimal Herbrand model) of T [ 9. Here, for each q 2 9, there is a ground rule of the form q j not q from cir(T; P ). Thus, T [ 9 = T M [ 9 M = cir(T; P ) M . Therefore, M is a minimal Herbrand model of cir(T; P ) M , hence an answer set of cir(T; P ).
On the other hand, let M be an answer set of cir(T; P ) such that M \ Q = 9. Then, M is a minimal Herbrand model of T [ 9, hence a P -minimal Herbrand model of T .
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In the bird example above, the axiom set can be written as flies bird; bird j not bird ; which has two answer sets, ; and fbird; fliesg, expressing flies bird.
It should be noted that the representation of xed predicates by positive not is in the same form as that of abducibles in Section 3.1. In this sense, we can see that xed predicates play the same role as abducible predicates in abductive logic programming.
Theorem 3.12. Let T be a PDP, and P the minimized predicates. Suppose that 0 is f q(x) j q 2 Q g where x = x 1 ; . . . ; x n is a tuple of variables for n-ary xed predicate q in Q. Then, M is a P -minimal Herbrand model of T i M is a belief model of h P; 0 i.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 3.2 and 3.11. 2
When some predicates are allowed to vary, Sakama and Inoue [57] show that circumscription of a clausal theory can be embedded in GEDPs, in which minimized predicates are specied using negation as failure in bodies of rules, while xed and varying predicates are expressed by negation as failure in heads. A generalization of Theorem 3.12 is also stated in [57, Theorem 4.2] . Furthermore, prioritized circumscription [37] is shown to be expressed using positive not in a logic programming framework extended with priorities [58] .
All or Nothing
The embeddings of abducibles, possible models and xed predicates in GEDPs in previous subsections are all based on the generation of the power set of a literal set. Namely, given a set 0 of literals, the rules i j not i for each i 2 0 ; can be used to produce 2 0 . There are many other variations for representing knowledge with positive not. For instance, for a nite set of literals 0 = f 1 ; . . . ; n g, the all-or-nothing choice can be represented by rules 1 j not 2 ; 2 j not 3 ;
. . . n01 j not n ; n j not 1 ; which generate an answer set containing all i 's and an answer set containing no i .
Example 3.13. John and Mary are a couple. So, \if John is at the party, so is Mary, and vice versa." If we represent this situation by the rules 5 1 : Mary-at-Party John-at-Party ; John-at-Party Mary-at-Party ; then we get the answer set ; only. Instead, with the rules 5 2 :
Mary-at-Party j not John-at-Party ; John-at-Party j not Mary-at-Party ; we have two possibilities: ; and f John-at-Party, Mary-at-Party g.
The above example shows the dierence between a rule of the form p q and a rule of the form p j not q , which will be analyzed more deeply in Section 4.
REDUCTION TO EXTENDED DISJUNCTIVE PROGRAMS
A GEDP has non-minimal answer sets in general. Then, our question is which class of GEDPs has non-minimal answer sets and can be distinguished from EDPs. Answering this question highlights the eect of negation as failure in the head and claries the expressiveness of GEDPs. In this section, we analyze the syntactic nature of GEDPs and investigate the relations between GEDPs and EDPs.
We rst consider the possibility of transforming GEDPs to semantically equivalent EDPs. Since a GEDP may have a non-minimal answer set, the following claim holds.
Observation 4.1. There is no transformation tr from GEDPs to EDPs such that any GEDP 5 and tr (5) have exactly the same answer sets.
Our concern is a subclass of GEDPs that have such a transformation to EDPs with the equivalence preserved. Consider, for example, the program 5 3 which consists of one rule p j not q : 5 3 has just one answer set ;. Note that fpg is not an answer set since the reduct of 5 3 by fpg is empty. The above rule can be read as \p is believed or q is not believed", and hence can be viewed as a conditional formula stating that \p is believed if q is believed". In this sense, the rule is similar to p q : In this case, the former rule can actually be replaced with the latter rule by shifting positive not into the body. However, suppose that one rule is added to 5 3 :
5 4 = 5 3 [ f q j not p g: Then, ; is still an answer set of 5 4 , but now fp; qg becomes another, non-minimal answer set. In fact, 5 4 has the same structure as 5 2 in Example 3.13. Hence, once a \deadlock" loop is constructed with these conditional formulas, a program may have two alternative answer sets, one including every element of the loop and the other including nothing in the loop. In other words, unless there is such a loop, not in the head can be shifted into the body without changing the answer sets. To formally identify such cases where positive not is not needed, the notion of acyclic GEDPs is introduced in the next subsection, and show that they reduce to EDPs.
Acyclic GEDPs
We rst dene acyclic GEDPs. In the following, a level mapping for a GEDP 5 is any mapping l: Lit ! N of ground literals in the language of 5 to natural numbers [2] . For any L 2 Lit, we call l(L) the level of L. for every negation-as-failure formula not D t (t = 1; . . . ; n) in the body of any rule of the form (9) . We ignore the level of each such literal as it is not necessary in the subsequent discussion. Dung [14] also introduced P-acyclic programs, which coincide with our (P-)acyclic NDPs. Our notion of acyclic programs is also a generalization of propositional acyclic EDPs dened by Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [6] . Observation 4.2. Any EDP is N-acyclic. This is because every literal in Lit can have the same level in this case. Hence, an EDP is acyclic i it is P-acyclic.
Example 4.1. A GEDP consisting of rules p q ; q j not p is P-acyclic but N-cyclic. It has two answer sets, ; and fp; qg. The shifting transformation eliminates every positive not from a GEDP in the simplest way. In fact, shift does not introduce any new literal into the language. This is compared with another translation edp that will be presented in Section 6.1, which requires new atoms to simulate positive not (see Remark 6.3). Note that a GEDP 5 is acyclic i shift(5) is (P-)acyclic. Now, we show that the shifting transformation is sound with respect to the answer set semantics for all GEDPs and is complete for N-acyclic GEDPs. Proof. Let S be an answer set of shift(5). Then, S is an answer set of shift (5) Recall that the class of N-acyclic GEDPs properly includes the class of EDPs (Observation 4.2). Now, Theorem 4.4 shows that the shifting transformation preserves the answer set semantics for N-acyclic GEDPs. This fact implies that an (N-)acyclic GEDP can always be reduced to an EDP without changing the answer sets. In other words, N-acyclic GEDPs collapse to EDPs. Then, the next question is when positive not is really eective. Interestingly, not all of positive not are needed even for N-cyclic programs. In fact, the shifting transformation in Theorem 4.4 can also be applied to the N-acyclic sub-program of any N-cyclic GEDP. Note that transformations of abducibles in abductive logic programming, disjunctions under the possible model semantics, and xed predicates in circumscription presented in Section 3 all result in N-cyclic rules in GEDPs. We now see that N-acyclic GEDPs (or EDPs) cannot precisely express these semantics as they involve non-minimal answer sets.
The N-acyclic condition is only a sucient condition for an equivalent transformation. An obvious necessary condition is that every answer set of a GEDP is minimal. However, this is not a sucient condition. For example, consider the GEDP 5 6 consisting of rules p j not p ; q p ; not q: 5 6 has the unique (and hence minimal) answer set fp; qg. But 5 6 is an N-cyclic program, and shift(5 6 ) has no answer set. Thus, the converse of Lemma 4.3 does not hold in general. Namely, for an N-cyclic GEDP 5, a minimal answer set of 5 is not necessarily an answer set of shift(5).
Integrity Constraints
Using Corollary 4.7, we see that a special kind of rules can always be transformed by the shifting without regarding any other rule. A rule having no literals but positive not in its head is called an integrity constraint. This is because such a rule is never used to infer a literal directly. For instance, not p q is an integrity constraint meaning that if q is believed then p cannot be believed. This rule has exactly the same eect as the integrity constraint p; q; which denotes that both p and q cannot be believed at the same time. In general, every integrity constraint can be represented as a rule with an empty head using the shifting transformation. 
Notice that these schemas for the coherence principle are converse to the rules for the closed world assumption:
:A not A (or A not :A): In [13] , rules (13) and (14) are used to compute the extended well-founded semantics for ELPs. The approach in [13] considers a paraconsistent semantics to capture the meaning of rules with positive not but without disjunctions. On the other hand, in the answer set semantics, the addition of these schemas for every atom A simply makes every answer set (if exists) consistent. Hence, as in ELPs [ Note that each rule representing the coherence principle is not used to derive any literal. Thus, under the answer set semantics, the rules of the coherence principles are integrity constraints. By Corollary 4.8, the schemas (13) and (14) can also be represented as A; :A for any atom A: Hence, the coherence principle can be expressed without positive not under the answer set semantics.
SUPPORTED SETS AND NON-MINIMAL ANSWER SETS
One of the most important criteria that any model theoretic semantics should satisfy is the \supportedness". Apt et al. [3] dened supported models for NLPs, and Marek and Subrahmanian [45] have shown that every stable model is a supported model. Recently, the notion of supported models has been extended for disjunctive programs by Baral and Gelfond [4] and by Brass and Dix [9] . In this section, we rst dene the corresponding notion for GEDPs, which is then used to analyze cyclic GEDPs.
Let 5 be any GEDP. A set of ground literals S Lit is a supported set of 5 if (i) S satises every ground rule from 5, and (ii) for any literal L 2 S there exists a ground rule This notion of supported sets reduces to that of [4] for EDPs, and to the notion of supported models of [9] for NDPs, and that of [3, 45] for NLPs. In fact, conditions (a), (b), and (c) are exactly the same as the denition by [4] . The last condition (d), together with (c), implies that all the disjuncts other than L in the head of the ground rule are not satised by S.
Example 5.1. ; is the unique supported set of 5 3 = f p j not q g. Both ; and fp; qg are supported sets of 5 7 = f p j not q ; q j not p q g, but the latter is not an answer set of 5 7 .
In the above example, all answer sets are supported sets. We now formally verify this relationship between supported sets and answer sets. However, we will show in Lemma 5.6 that the converse holds for P-acyclic GEDPs.
Supported Sets in Shifting
The supported set semantics is preserved through the shifting transformation for any GEDP. Namely, any GEDP collapses to an EDP under the supported set semantics. Next, we consider how the shifting transformation aects the relationship between supported sets and answer sets of GEDPs. We have seen in Section 4.1 that the answer set semantics is preserved by the shifting for N-acyclic GEDPs. For P-acyclic GEDPs, we will show that answer sets of programs are precisely supported sets of shifted programs.
Lemma 5.5. [6, Theorem 2.3] Let P be a (P-)acyclic EDP, and S Lit. S is a consistent answer set of P i S is a consistent supported set of P .
Lemma 5.6. Every consistent supported set of a P-acyclic GEDP 5 is a consistent answer set of 5.
Proof. Let The next corollary summarizes the properties of acyclic GEDPs. Recall that a GEDP is acyclic i it is both P-acyclic and N-acyclic. As far as the authors know, there does not seem to exist a proof procedure for computing the supported model semantics for normal or extended (disjunctive) programs, although many researchers point out the importance of supported models. The diculty seems to lie in the fact that there are non-minimal supported models of programs. In this subsection, we characterize the supported sets for any GEDP in terms of its answer sets. This implies that it provides a method to compute supported models proposed in the literature [3, 45, 4, 9] . To this end, we utilize the inverse shifting dened as follows. Let 5 be any GEDP. The GEDP invshift (5) Proof. S is a consistent answer set of invshift (5) i S is a consistent supported set of shift(invshift (5) 
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Two important results follow from Theorem 5.10. First, the supported set semantics for any GEDP can be completely characterized in terms of the answer set semantics. Secondly, computation of supported sets of a GEDP 5 is realized by that of answer sets of the GEDP invshift(5), which is then reduced to that of answer sets of the EDP obtained by the edp translation that will be shown in Section 6.1. Then, to get supported sets, we can use any proof procedure for computing answer sets of EDPs (see Section 6.3).
COMPLEXITY AND COMPUTATION
In this section, we consider the computational complexity of GEDPs and present an algorithm to compute the answer sets of a nite GEDP. These results indicate that positive not can be eliminated from programs so that we can use any proof procedure for computing EDPs or PDPs.
Simulation of Positive not by EDPs
We rst show a polynomial-time translation from a GEDP into an EDP. Let 5 be any GEDP. The extended disjunctive program edp (5) Next, suppose that there is a rule (15) in 5 such that fL m+1 ; . . . ; L n g \ S = ; but 9L j (k + 1 j l) such that L j 6 2 S. In this case, there is no corresponding rule (21) in 5 S , but the rule (22) is present in edp(5) S . edp(5) S also contains the rules (17, 18, 20) and the rules i for i = 1; . . . ; k (from the rule (19)). Then, for each such rule R 0 (22) of edp (5) Now let 6 = S [ 63, where 63 is a minimal subset of 61 [ 62 such that each i or j is chosen in a way that 6 satises every rule of the form (22, 17, 18, 20) and the reduct of (19) by S. Obviously, it holds that S = 6 \ Lit 5 . Because new literals i 's never appear within not, the program edp(5) S is exactly the same as the program edp(5) 6 . Then, 6 satises all the rules of edp (5) 6 , and if S = Lit 5 then Lit 5 6 .
To see that 6 is a minimal set satisfying the rules of edp(5) 6 , notice that S is a minimal set satisfying the rules of 5 S . From the construction of 63, it is easy to see that 6 is a minimal set containing S and satisfying the rules of edp (5) 6 . We thus only need to verify that there is no 6 0 such that (i) 6 0 6, (ii) 6 0 satises the rules of edp (5) 6 , and (iii) S 0 S for S 0 = 6 0 \ Lit 5 . Suppose to the contrary that such a 6 0 exists. Then, the condition (iii) is satised only if there exist rules (17, 18) such that L i 2 S n S 0 and i 2 6 n 6 0 for some 1 i k. For this i , there must be the rule (22) such that fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g S 0 . By the condition (ii), there is a literal j 2 6 0 for some k + 1 j l. This j , however, is not included in 62 by (20) , contradicting the condition (i). Therefore, 6 is an answer set of edp (5) 6 , and hence an answer set of edp (5) .
Conversely, let 6 be an answer set of edp (5), and S = 6 \ Lit 5 . Since 6 is an answer set of edp (5) 6 , for each rule (22) in edp(5) 6 , if fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g S, then i 2 6 for some 1 i l. There are two cases: (a) If i 2 6 for some 1 i k, then L i 2 S by (17) and hence fL k+1 ; . . . ; L l g S by (19) . Then, the corresponding rule (21) exists in 5 S and S satises it; (b) If i 6 2 6 but j 2 6 for some 1 i k and k + 1 j l, then L j 6 2 S by (20) . Then, there is no corresponding rule (21) in 5 S . In either case, S satises all rules of 5 S .
Suppose that there is a set S 0 of literals from Lit 5 such that (i) S 0 S and (ii) S 0 satises the rules of 5 S . Then, two conditions (i) and (ii) are satised only if there is a rule (21) such that fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g S 0 and for some two literals L i1 and L i2 (1 i1; i2 k; i1 6 = i2) L i1 2 S 0 but L i2 2 S n S 0 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that just one such rule exists in 5 S . Since S and S 0 contain L k+1 ; . . . ; L l in the corresponding rule (15) in 5, i1 ; i2 2 6 by (18). Let 6 0 = 6nfL i2 ; i2 g. Then, 6 0 satises all the rules (22, 17, 18, 20) existing in edp(5) 6 . This contradicts the fact that 6 is an answer set of edp(5) 6 . Hence, S is an answer set of 5 S and therefore an answer set of 5.
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We thus see that any GEDP can be translated to an EDP by eliminating positive not. The fact that non-minimal answer sets of GEDPs can be expressed by answer sets of EDPs that must be minimal is a somewhat surprising and unexpected result. The reason why this simulation is possible is that the newly introduced atoms i 's have the eect to distinguish each positive not, and each answer set of edp (5) becomes minimal by the existence of these new atoms. Example 6.2. Suppose that the GEDP 5 9 is given as p j not q ; q j not p : The answer sets of 5 9 are ffp; qg; ;g. Correspondingly, its translated program edp(5 9 ) = f 1 j 2 ; 3 j 4 ; p 1 ; 1 p; q; 1 ; not q; 2 ; q; q 3 ; 3 q; p; 3 ; not p; 4 ; p g has the answer sets ff 1 ; 3 ; p; qg; f 2 ; 4 gg. Remark 6.3. The edp translation maps GEDPs to EDPs so that there is a one-toone correspondence between both answer sets. Although the edp translation can be applied to any GEDP, the resultant EDP cannot have exactly the same answer sets as those of the original GEDP (Observation 4.1) . This means that we need an extra mechanism to recover an original answer set, that is, removing every new atom i from an answer set of the created EDP. On the other hand, we have provided the shifting transformation of GEDPs to EDPs in Section 4.1. Although the shifting transformation is not complete for every GEDP, it preserves the equivalence of programs for N-acyclic GEDPs and does not need the additional task to remove i 's.
Complexity Results
We are now ready to give the complexity results for GEDPs. Since the class of GEDPs includes the class of EDPs and we have shown a polynomial-time translation from a GEDP into an EDP, the next result follows immediately from the complexity results of EDPs given by Eiter and Gottlob [16] . Theorem 6.4 demonstrates that allowing positive not does not increase the computational complexity of the answer set semantics. Eiter and Gottlob also show that the complexity results for EDPs apply to EDPs without classical negation : as well. Therefore, GEDPs are in the same complexity class as NDPs. Furthermore, Theorem 6.4 (b) also applies to the minimal model semantics for PDPs. This observation leads us to a further translation in Section 6.3.
Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [6] have shown the (co-)NP-completeness of a restricted class of EDPs. According to their notations, a dependency graph of a ground EDP P is a directed graph in which its nodes are literals in P and there is an edge from L to L 0 i there is a rule in P such that L appears in the body and L 0 appears in the head of the rule. An EDP is head-cycle free if its dependency graph contains no directed cycle that goes through two dierent literals in the head of the same disjunctive rule. Then, three problems in Theorem 6.4 for propositional head-cycle free EDPs are reducible to the problem of satisability or provability of propositional formulas in polynomial-time [6] . Here, we show such a reduction of complexity results is also possible for a restricted class of GEDPs, by generalizing their results.
The dependency graph of a GEDP is dened in the same way as that of an EDP except that an additional edge is considered for positive not. Given a GEDP 5, its dependency graph G 5 is a directed graph in which its nodes are ground literals from 5 and there is an edge from L to L 0 i there is a ground rule R from 5 such that either (i) L appears in the body and L 0 appears in the head of R; or (ii) both not L and L 0 appears in the head of R. Thus, while each not L in bodies is ignored, each not L in heads constructs an edge in G 5 (recall that we also ignored the level of every not L in bodies in the denition of acyclic GEDPs in Section 4.1). A GEDP 5 is head-cycle free if G 5 contains no directed cycle that goes through two literals L i1 ; L i2 (1 i1; i2 k; L i1 6 = L i2 ) in any ground rule of the form (15) from 5. The class of head-cycle free GEDPs obviously includes the class of head-cycle free EDPs and the class of ELPs. Also, the class of head-cycle free GEDPs includes the class of GEDPs each of whose rule permits in the head at most one L 0 but any number of not L's:
. . . ; L m ; not L m+1 ; . . . ; not L n : The class of head-cycle free GEDPs further includes the class of acyclic GEDPs: Observation 6.1. Every acyclic GEDP is head-cycle-free. Moreover, the dependency graph of an acyclic GEDP has no directed cycle.
The converse of the above observation does not necessarily hold when the dependency graph has an innite decreasing chain. For example, the program 5 5 in Example 4.2 (Section 4.1) has no directed cycle, but is not acyclic. Now, we show that the head-cycle free property is preserved by the edp translation.
Lemma 6.5. Let 5 be a GEDP. 5 is head-cycle free i edp (5) is head-cycle free.
Proof. An edge from L j to L i for j = k + 1; . . . ; l and i = 1; . . . ; k in the same rule (15) is in G 5 i a path from L j to L i through rules (18) and (17) is in G edp (5) . Then, each directed path from L to L 0 in G 5 is contained in G edp (5) , and vice versa. Hence, any two literals L i1 ; L i2 (1 i1; i2 k) in the same rule (15) are contained in a cycle in G 5 i the literals i1 ; i2 in the corresponding rule (16) are contained in a cycle in G edp (5) .
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The next result follows from Theorem 6.1, Lemma 6.5 and complexity results of head-cycle free EDPs by [6] . It says that the computational complexity for the answer set semantics of head-cycle-free GEDPs lies at the rst level of the polynomial hierarchy, which is exactly the same level as that of head-cycle-free EDPs or NLPs. Note that the class of head-cycle free GEDPs includes, as a special case, the class of programs P [ abd(0 ) obtained from abductive programs h P; 0 i where both P and 0 are ELPs (see Section 3.2) . This fact and results in Section 3 imply that computational problems for abductive NLPs [31] , knowledge systems [26] , and the possible model semantics for NDPs [55] have all the same complexity results as in Theorem 6.6. These results are also stated in [56] based on translations of such programs into NLPs.
Computing Answer Sets of Arbitrary GEDP
To compute the answer set semantics for any GEDP 5, we can apply any proof procedure for EDPs to the EDP edp(5) obtained in Section 6.1. To this end, a bottom-up proof procedure for EDPs has been proposed by Inoue et al. [27] to compute answer sets of EDPs using model generation techniques. Here, we present an essence of the method of [27] . First, each EDP P is converted into its positive form P + , which is obtained from P by replacing each negative literal :L with a new atom -L. Note that P + is an NDP. We also denote the positive form of a set S of literals as S + . Next, P + is translated into the set fo(P + ) of rst-order formulas by completely eliminating not as follows. For each rule in P + of the form 
:
for each pair L; -L 2 Lit P + : (26) Here, KL is a new atom which denotes that L should be true, and -KL is the positive form of :KL. Now, let I be an Herbrand interpretation of fo(P + ), i.e., a set of ground atoms in the language of fo(P + ). Then, we say that I satises the stability condition if it holds that KL 2 I implies L 2 I for every atom L 2 Lit P + : (27) Lemma 6.7.
[27] Let P be an EDP, and S Lit P . S is a consistent answer set of P i M is a minimal Herbrand model of fo(P + ) such that S + = M \ Lit P + and that M satises the stability condition.
The next theorem completely characterizes the consistent answer sets of a GEDP in terms of the above rst-order translation. 6 Theorem 6. Proof. The result follows from Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 6.7. 2
It is well known that for PDPs minimal Herbrand models coincide with answer sets. Then, the formula (24) 6 Although Theorem 6.8 does not cover the contradictory answer set of 5, the methods used in [27] can be applied to identify the answer set Lit 5 . Hence, the set fo(P + ) can also be viewed as a PDP. We thus now have a polynomialtime translation from GEDPs into PDPs. Hence, to obtain answer sets of GEDPs, any procedure to compute minimal Herbrand models of PDPs can be applied as well. There are several techniques for this computation such as [5, 27, 18] . In particular, our translation is suitable for applying a bottom-up model generation procedure to compute answer sets of function-free and range-restricted GEDPs. Since we have characterized abductive programs as well as other commonsense reasoning in GEDPs in Section 3, they can also be computed by model generation procedures. Inoue et al. [28] have developed such a parallel abductive procedure, and Inoue and Sakama [30] have given a xpoint semantics that accounts for the correctness of such bottom-up procedures using a similar translation. 
RELATION TO NONMONOTONIC FORMALISMS
Recent research on the semantics of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning has demonstrated that both elds have inuenced each other. In this section, we establish the relationship between GEDPs and existing nonmonotonic formalisms. In particular, there is a close relationship between GEDPs and autoepistemic logic.
Recall that the class of GEDPs is the \logic programming" fragment of propositional MBNF [38] . The embedding of the rule (1) [54] show translations into default logic [52] , autoepistemic logic [49] and circumscription [47] . Since we have presented the translation of GEDPs into 7 When an EDP P is an NDP, P + = P holds and fo(P ) need not include the schema (26) .
EDPs, these previous results can be directly applied to embed GEDPs in such nonmonotonic formalisms via the edp translation.
Although these results are all correct, the translation of GEDPs into EDPs introduces new literals like i 's. One often wants to see a stronger result such that the logical closure of an answer set is exactly the same as an extension of a nonmonotonic formalism and that the set of literals true in the extension is exactly the answer set. In such an extension, the introduction of new literals should be avoided. Then, those formalisms that obey the principle of minimality such as (disjunctive) default logic and circumscription are rejected for this purpose. With this regard, the remaining candidate is autoepistemic logic. Lifschitz and Schwarz [39, Corollary 3.1] and Chen [12, Theorem 6] have independently provided the correct embedding of EDPs in autoepistemic logic. Moreover, both results are proved in a way applicable to a more general class of programs including consistent PL-theories of [41] . Here, we can take advantage of their proofs. 8 Recall that a formula in autoepistemic logic is called objective if it does not contain the modal operator B; otherwise it is subjective. An autoepistemic theory is a set of formulas in autoepistemic logic. An autoepistemic theory is stable if it is closed under the logical and introspective consequences. Namely, a stable set T satises the conditions: (i) T = cons(T ), where cons(T ) denotes the set of logical consequences (in the sense of classical rst-order logic) of T ; (ii) if ' 2 T then B' 2 T , and (iii) if ' 6 2 T then :B' 2 T . The meaning of each autoepistemic theory is usually characterized by the following stable set that is expanded from the theory: Given an autoepistemic theory K, a set T is a stable expansion of K i it satises that T = cons(K [ fB' j ' 2 T g [ f:B' j ' 6 2 T g) : It is well known that for each set F of objective formulas, there is a unique stable set E(F ) containing F such that the objective formulas in E(F ) are exactly the same as those in cons(F ). Moreover, if a theory K contains only objective formulas, then E(K) is a unique stable expansion of K [49] .
Given a GEDP 5, its autoepistemic translation ae(5) is dened as follows: Each rule of the form (1) in 5 is translated into the following formula in ae (5) (30) Note that this class of GEDPs is a subset of the class of head-cycle free GEDPs, and includes the class of NLPs 9 and programs P [ abd(0) that are translated from abductive NLPs h P; 0 i. Let us denote as ae n (5) the set of autoepistemic formulas obtained from a GEDP 5 by replacing each rule of the form (29) with (30) . An essential dierence between ae(5) and ae n (5) for a set 5 of rules of the form (29) is that, while ae n may map two dierent programs with the same answer sets into two autoepistemic theories with dierent stable expansions, the stable expansions of ae (5) are uniquely determined by the answer sets of 5 [39] . For example, both 5 3 = f p j not q g and 5 10 = f p q g have the same unique answer set ;, but ae n (5 3 ) = f Bq p g has the stable expansion E(;), while ae n (5 10 ) = f q p g has the stable expansion E(fq pg). On the other hand, both ae(5 3 ) = f Bq (p^Bp) g and ae(5 10 ) = f (q^Bq) (p^Bp) g have the same unique stable expansion E(;). Nevertheless, we have the following one-to-one correspondence between the answer sets of 5 and the stable expansions of ae n (5).
Corollary 7.2. Let 5 be a consistent GEDP such that 5 is a set of rules of the form (29) , and S a set of atoms. S is an answer set of 5 i S is the set of objective atoms true in a stable expansion of ae n (5).
Proof. Suppose that S is an answer set of 5. By Theorem 7.1, there is a stable expansion E of ae(5) such that S = E \ At where At is the set of atoms occurring in 5 and that E = cons(S [ fB' j ' 2 Eg [ f:B' j ' 6 2 Eg) : The set fB' j ' 2 Eg includes BA for each A 2 S. In the presence of these subjective atoms, all the objective atoms S in E also follows from some stable expansion E 0 of ae n (5), and vice versa. Hence, S = E 0 \ At. The converse direction can also be shown in the same manner.
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The above corollary can also be applied to the embedding of the possible model semantics for a NDP P since each rule in the translated GEDP pm(P ) is in the form (29 Proof. The translated formula is equivalent to the conjunction of the ae n translation of rules (7) and (8) in pm(P ). Then, the corollary follows from Theorem 3.9 9 An autoepistemic translation of NLPs, which maps each rule without positive not into (30), was rstly introduced by Gelfond [19] . and Corollary 7.2.
Now, let us look again at the embedding of abduction in GEDPs given in Theorem 3.2. The rule (3) j not is translated into (B^) _ :B by the autoepistemic translation, which is then equivalent to B :
(31) The set consisting of the formula (31) produces two stable expansions, one containing and B, the other containing :B but neither nor :. Historically, the rst expansion has been regarded as anomalous since the belief of is based solely on the assumption that is believed with no other support [33] . However, this situation is naturally interpreted in abduction. The fact that the formula (31) is the archetype to generate hypotheses strongly justies the correctness of our use of positive not in the corresponding rule (3) .
Finally, the relationship between the supported set semantics of GEDPs and autoepistemic logic can also be equipped in order to highlight the underlying nonmonotonicity of the formalism. Marek and Subrahmanian [45] have proposed such a connection for NLPs. In our case, it is enough to apply the autoepistemic translation ael to the supported set semantics via the inverse shifting of Theorem 5.10. Namely, given a GEDP 5, its supported sets can be characterized by the stable expansions of the inversely shifted GEDP ael(invshift (5)).
In summary, we have utilized the \non-minimal" nature of autoepistemic logic to express abduction and inclusive disjunctions in knowledge representation. The introspective nature of autoepistemic logic enable us to believe a certain proposition (say P ) either from the lack of belief in other propositions (through :BQ P for example) or from no additional precondition (through BP P for example). These properties can completely describe the meanings of negative and positive occurrences of negation as failure in logic programming. 8 . DISCUSSION
1. Brewka and Konolige [10] give another semantics for GEDPs which is dierent from the answer set semantics in this paper. They allow positive not in a program but still obey the principle of minimality. Consequently, their semantics can never represent non-minimal canonical models and its relationship to autoepistemic logic must be dierent from ours. In this respect, they suggest the use of moderately grounded expansions [33] for the embedding. However, the following example demonstrates that moderately grounded expansions are of no use to characterize the minimal answer sets of GEDPs. Instead, parsimonious stable expansions [15] appropriately characterize the minimal answer sets.
Recall that a stable expansion of an autoepistemic theory K is moderately grounded if its objective part is not larger than the objective part of any other stable set that includes K. A stable expansion of K is parsimonious if its objective part is not larger than the objective part of any other stable expansion of K. Note that each moderately grounded expansion is parsimonious but the converse does not necessarily hold.
Example 8.1. Consider the GEDP 5 6 given in Section 4.1: p j not p ; q p; not q : 5 6 has the unique (and hence minimal) answer set fp; qg. The autoepistemic translation of 5 6 is ae n (5 6 ) = f Bp p; p q; Bq g : This autoepistemic theory has no moderately grounded expansion. In fact, E(fp; qg) is not a minimal stable set that includes ae n (5 6 ) since E(fqg) is a stable set containing ae n (5 6 ) and its objective part is smaller than that of E(fp; qg). On the other hand, E(fp; qg) is the unique parsimonious stable expansion. Theorem 8.2. Let 5 be a consistent GEDP, and S a set of literals. S is a minimal answer set of 5 i E(S) is a parsimonious stable expansion of ae(5).
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 7.1 and the denition of parsimonious stable expansions.
Recall that our answer set semantics for GEDPs is characterized by stable expansions of the translated autoepistemic theories. From the complexity viewpoint, Eiter and Gottlob have shown that deciding whether an objective formula belongs to some parsimoniously grounded expansion of an autoepistemic theory is 6 P 3 -complete in general [15] , while the same problem for some stable expansion is 6 P 2 -complete [25] . From this observation, it is conjectured that computing with a minimal answer set of a GEDP is harder than computing with any answer set unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
2. An interesting property of the rule (3) j not is that it is valid in the sense that every answer set satises it, that is, is either contained or not contained in it. In autoepistemic logic, the corresponding formula (31) is always contained in any stable expansion. However, the modal axiom schema of the same form T : B' ' cannot be put into the premise set without changing its stable expansions [49] . Similarly, adding the rule L j not L to a program allows the literal L to be sanctioned that otherwise would not be, but this may cause literals that are entailed by the program to decrease since the number of answer sets increases. For example, q is entailed by the program containing one rule q not p ; but once p j not p is adopted q is no longer entailed. Another example of this property can be seen in the fact that a declaration of xed predicates prevents overminimization and undesired side eects in circumscription (Section 3.4). Sometimes such an addition of valid rules may make an incoherent program get an answer set.
For example, q not p ;
:q has no answer set, but with the rule p j not p it obtains the answer set f:q; pg. The rule L j not L in GEDPs and the schema T in autoepistemic logic can thus be applied to various domains other than abduction such as contradiction resolution and reection in the sense of Konolige's analysis of meta reasoning [34] .
3. Gelfond gives another cautious semantics for the closed world assumption in order to treat Example 3.10 properly by introducing the concept of strong introspection [20] . However, unlike Theorem 3.9 for our possible model semantics, this concept cannot be embedded in MBNF [38] .
On the other hand, Eiter et al. propose a new nonmonotonic formalism called curbing [17] which interprets disjunctions inclusively. Since their good models are not necessarily minimal models, it is interesting to see whether MBNF can express curbing or not. In the context of PDPs, it turns out that there is a close relationship between good models and possible models. [40] show that a special form of positive not can be replaced with classical negation. As we have seen in Section 3.1, abducible literals L and :L can be encoded as rules L j not L ;
Lifschitz and Turner
:L j not :L : In their setting (on the domain of reasoning about action), under the existence of the completeness rule for L: not L; not :L; the above two abducible rules can be represented by the rule L j :L : While this kind of replacement is sometimes possible, positive not is generally quite dierent from classical negation in heads. For example, as noted in Section 4, 5 3 = f p j not q g has the unique answer set ;, but f p j :q g has two answer sets fpg and f:qg.
5. Marek et al. [43] characterize the supported models of NLPs by means of their framework of constraint programming. Roughly speaking, a rule with the constraint of the form A B 1 ; . . . ; B m : 1^. . .^ n is read as \A if B 1 ; . . . ; B m under the condition that 1^. . .^ n holds". Thus, the body of this rule contains two kinds of conditions: those to be evaluated minimally (B i 's) as usual and those to be expected its supportedness ( j 's). In other words, constraint programming oers the spectrum of the answer set/supported set semantics for NLPs. This rule corresponds to a rule with positive not of the form A j not 1 j . . . j not n B 1 ; . . . ; B m :
Hence, their framework is also characterized using positive not.
6. It is worth noting that there is a GEDP whose dependency graph contains no directed cycle but it has non-minimal answer sets. For example, the program 5 11 : p(x) j not p(s(x)) ; q(0) has answer sets fq(0)g and fq(0); p(0); p(s(0)); p(s 2 (0)); . . .g. Since 5 11 is not Nacyclic, Theorem 4.4 cannot be applied to this program. In fact, shift(5 11 ) = f p(x) p(s(x)); q(0) g; which is the same as program 5 5 in Example 4.2 (Section 4.1), has the unique answer set fq(0)g. However, since 5 11 is P-acyclic, the innite answer set of 5 11 is also a supported set of 5 5 by Theorem 5.7. This example indicates that the theory of positive not or supported sets may have interesting applications to perpetual processes in the line of [42, Chapter 6] . 9 . CONCLUSION This paper has provided a number of new results in the class of general extended disjunctive programs (GEDPs), i.e., disjunctive programs which permit negation as failure and classical negation both positively and negatively. The class of GEDPs is a natural extension of previously proposed logic programs. In particular, we have shown in this paper embedding of abductive programs, the possible model semantics for NDPs, xed predicates in circumscription in the answer set semantics for GEDPs, a syntactic condition under which a GEDP collapses to an EDP using the shifting transformation, characterization of the supported set semantics for GEDPs in terms of the answer set semantics for GEDPs, the computational complexity of GEDPs based on a polynomial-time translation of GEDPs into EDPs, an algorithm to compute answer sets of GEDPs based on a translation of GEDPs into PDPs, and the relationship between GEDPs and autoepistemic logic. In conclusion, negation as failure in the head opens new possibilities of logic programming for representing commonsense knowledge. The most interesting property of GEDPs is that they may have non-minimal answer sets. It is due to the N-cyclic property that abductive programs, inclusive disjunctions and xed predicates can be encoded as GEDPs with positive not. Incidentally, supported sets have a similar non-minimal property, and we have actually established the relationship between positive not and supported sets. Moreover, from the computational viewpoint, it has been shown that positive not does not introduce an extra complexity source. Therefore, computation of answer sets of GEDPs is realized using any proof procedure for computing answer sets of EDPs. With these results, we conclude that the concept of negation as failure in the head is a useful tool for representing knowledge in various domains in which the principle of minimality is too strong.
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